Role of aspiration-induced migration in cooperation by Yang, Han-Xin et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
10
9.
09
50
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.bi
o-
ph
]  
5 S
ep
 20
11
Role of aspiration-induced migration in cooperation
Han-Xin Yang1,∗ Zhi-Xi Wu2,† and Bing-Hong Wang1,3‡
1Department of Modern Physics, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
2Department of Physics, Ume˚a University, 90187 Ume˚a, Sweden
3The Research Center for Complex System Science,
University of Shanghai for Science and Technology and Shanghai Academy of System Science, Shanghai, 200093 China
(Dated: October 30, 2018)
Both cooperation and migration are ubiquitous in human society and animal world. In this paper,
we propose an aspiration-induced migration in which individuals will migrate to new sites provided
that their payoffs are below some aspiration level. It is found that moderate aspiration level can
best favor cooperative behavior. In particular, moderate aspiration level enables cooperator clusters
to maintain stably and expand efficiently, whereas induces defector clusters to disintegrate, thus
promoting the diffusion of cooperation among population. Our results provide new insights into
understanding the role played by migration in the emergence of cooperative behavior.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb
Cooperation is fundamental to biological and social
systems. Many important mechanisms have been con-
sidered for studying the cooperative behavior, such as
costly punishment [1, 2], reputation [3, 4] and social di-
versity [5–7]. As is well-known, migration is a common
and essential feature present in animal world and human
society. For example, every year millions of animals mi-
grate in the savannas of Africa, and every day thousands
of people travel among different countries. Recently, the
role of migration has received much attention in the study
of evolutionary games [8–14].
Migration can be in a random-walk way. For example,
Vainstein et al. studied the case in which individuals are
located on the sites of a two-dimensional regular lattice
and each individual makes an attempt to jump to a near-
est neighboring empty site chosen randomly with some
probability [10], Meloni et al. consider the case in which
individuals are situated on a two-dimensional plane and
each individual moves to a randomly chosen position with
certain velocity [13]. Besides, the direction of migration
can be payoff biased, that is, individuals choose the des-
tination of migration according to payoff. For example,
Helbing et al. proposed a success-driven migration mech-
anism in which individuals will move to the sites with
highest estimated payoffs [11], Boyd et al. divided in-
dividuals into different subpopulations, the fraction of
individuals in subpopulation i who leave and join sub-
population j depends on the payoff difference between
two subpopulations [14].
It is noted that in many real-life situations, individuals
have to migrate when they cannot find enough resources
for living. For example, animals will migrate to other
places if they cannot find enough food in the current
habitats. Based on such consideration, we propose an
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aspiration-induced migration model, wherein each indi-
vidual plays with all its neighbors and accumulates pay-
offs correspondingly; An individual will move to another
place if its payoff is lower than the aspiration level, and
stay otherwise in the current location. Here the aspira-
tion level can be understood as the minimum living stan-
dard for each individual. Considering limited information
of the individuals, we assume that, migrants choose new
places in a random way.
We use the famous prisoner’s dilemma game
(PDG) [15] to carry out our researches. In the PDG
played by two players, each of whom chooses one of two
strategies, cooperation or defection. They both receive
payoff R upon mutual cooperation and P upon mutual
defection. If one defects while the other cooperates, co-
operator receives S while defector gets T . The ranking
of the four payoff values is: T > R > P > S. Following
common practice [16], we set T = b (> 1), R = 1, and
P = S = 0, where b represents the temptation to defect.
We assume prisoner’s dilemma players on a square with
periodic boundary conditions and L× L sites, which are
either empty or occupied by one individual. Initially, an
equal percentage of strategies (cooperators or defectors)
is randomly distributed among the population. Individ-
uals are updated asynchronously, in a random sequential
order. The randomly selected individual plays against
individuals sitting on four neighboring nodes (the von
Neumann neighborhood), collecting the payoff from the
combats. The individual compares its total payoff with
its direct neighbors and changes strategy following the
one (including itself) with the highest payoff. Before up-
dating strategy, an individual decides whether to stay at
or leave its current site. Individual stays in current site
if its payoff reaches or exceeds its aspiration level, other-
wise it moves to a randomly chosen empty site within its
four neighboring sites. To avoid isolated case, we assume
that an isolated individual makes mandatory move.
Following previous study [17], the aspiration level Pia
for an individual i is defined as Pia = kiA, where ki is
the number of neighbors of i and A is a control parame-
2ter (A is the same for all individuals). This definition is
based on the following consideration: In real life costless
relationships are rare; To maintain social relationship,
some cost are required; We assume for simplicity that
the needed cost is the same for each link. Thus it is rea-
sonable to assume the aspiration level to be proportional
to the number of neighbors.
Figure 1 shows the fraction of cooperators ρc as a func-
tion of the aspiration level A for different values of the
temptation to defect b when the fraction of occupied sites
f = 0.5. One can see that, ρc exhibits discontinuous
phase transition with varying A and ρc is the same be-
tween two nearby phase transition points. The value of
phase transition point can be determined by the average
payoff of an individual (total payoff divided by the num-
ber of neighbors), which may be 0, 1/2, b/2, 1/3, 2/3, b/3,
2b/3, 1, b (here we exclude the isolated case in which in-
dividual makes mandatory move and four-neighbors case
in which individual cannot move). Taking b = 1.5 as ex-
ample, the phase transition values of A are 0, 1/3, 1/2,
2/3 respectively (here 0.75, 1 and 1.5 are excluded since
ρc = 0 for A > 2/3 when b = 1.5) [18].
From Fig. 1, one can also find, for a fixed value of
the temptation to defect b, there exists an optimal re-
gion of A, leading to the highest cooperation level. For
b = 1.2 and b = 1.5, the optimal region of A is (0.6, 2/3]
and (0.5,2/3] respectively, indicating that moderate as-
piration level best favors cooperation. For b = 1.51, the
optimal region of A is (−∞, 0], in which all individuals
do not move. This is because, according to the analysis
in Ref. [19], compared with never-move case, migration
makes it easier for defectors to invade cooperator clusters
when b > 1.5.
How to understand moderate aspiration level best pro-
motes cooperation when b ≤ 1.5? It has been known
that in spatial games, cooperators can survive by form-
ing clusters, in which the benefits of mutual cooperation
can outweigh losses against defectors, thus enable cooper-
ation to be maintained [16, 20]. For low aspiration level,
most individuals do not move. Consequently, cooperator-
and defector-clusters coexist and keep almost unchanged
in the stationary state, inhibiting the dispersal of cooper-
ation among population. On the contrary, for high aspi-
ration level, most individuals move. Due to the frequent
change of neighbors, cooperators can not form clusters to
resist the invasion of defectors. As a result, cooperators
are doomed to extinct, analogous to the situation arising
in the well-mixed population.
For moderate aspiration level, cooperators can form
stable clusters since high benefits of mutual cooperation
insure them to stay in cooperator clusters, whereas de-
fectors avoid gathering together because the payoffs of
mutual defection are low. Figure 2 shows that, during
the process of evolution, the number of mobile defec-
tors Nmd is much larger than mobile cooperators Nmc
when b = 1.5, A = 0.6, indicating moderate aspiration
level enables cooperator clusters to be sustained whereas
induces defector clusters to be disintegrated. A mobile
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Fraction of cooperators ρc as a function
of the aspiration level A for different values of the temptation
to defect b. The simulations are for 100× 100 grids with the
fraction of occupied sites f = 0.5. The equilibrium fraction
of cooperators results from averaging over 2000 time steps af-
ter a transient period of 20000 time steps. Each time step
consists of on average one strategy-updating event of all the
individuals. Results are averaged over 100 different realiza-
tions.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The number of mobile cooperators
Nmc and mobile defectors Nmd as a function of time step t
on 100 × 100 grids with 50% empty sites. b = 1.5, A = 0.6.
Results are averaged over 100 different realizations.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Snapshots of typical distributions of cooperators (blue) and defectors (red) at different time steps t for
b = 1.5 and A = 0.6. The simulations are for 100 × 100 grids with 50% empty sites (white). (a) t = 1, ρc(1) = 0.5, (b) t = 16,
ρc(16) = 0.0298, (c) t = 370, ρc(370) = 0.302, and (d) t = 3000, ρc(3000) = 0.976.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The color code shows the fraction of
cooperators ρc as a function of the aspiration level A and the
fraction of occupied sites f on 100×100 grids. The temptation
to defect b = 1.5. Results are averaged over 100 different
realizations.
defector would change to cooperator if it touches coop-
erator cluster and encounters a cooperator who has the
highest payoff among defector and its neighbors (this sit-
uation is likely to occur since cooperator clusters usually
obtain high payoffs). Thus, for moderate aspiration level,
cooperator clusters not only be able to maintain, but also
expand due to the existence of migration.
To intuitively understand how moderate aspiration
level affects the evolution of cooperation, we plot the dis-
tribution of cooperators and defectors on a square lattice
at different time steps t for b = 1.5 and A = 0.6. Ini-
tially (t = 1), cooperators and defectors are randomly
distributed with the same probability on the square lat-
tice [see Fig. 3(a)]. From Fig. 3(b), we can see that co-
operators and defectors are quickly clustered respectively
(t = 16), and the density of cooperators at this moment
is lower than the initial state because cooperators are ex-
posed to much attack of defectors before the formation of
steady cooperator clusters. As time step t increases, co-
operator clusters expand and defector clusters shrink [see
Fig. 3(c)]. Finally, cooperators take over the population
and defectors only dispersedly survive nearby coopera-
tor clusters [see Fig. 3(d)], demonstrating that moderate
aspiration level can effectively impulse the collapse of de-
fector clusters.
The fraction of occupied sites f also affects the evo-
lution of cooperation. Figure 4 shows the fraction of
cooperators ρc as a function of the aspiration level A and
the fraction of occupied sites f together when the temp-
tation to defect b = 1.5. From Fig. 4, one can see that,
the optimal region of A corresponding to the highest co-
operation level changes as f varies. For example, the
optimal region of A is (0.5,2/3] and (1/3,0.5] for f = 0.5
and f = 0.8 respectively. Besides, one can find that, for
a fixed value of A, ρc varies as f changes. For A ≤ 1/3
and A > 2/3, ρc increases as f increases and f = 1 cor-
responds to the maximum ρc. For 1/3 < A ≤ 2/3, there
exists an intermediate value of f , leading to the highest
cooperation level.
There is much current interest in studying evolution-
ary games on various networks [21–27]. It has been found
that spatial structure greatly affects the evolution of co-
operation [21]. As a natural extension, we now consider
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Fraction of cooperators ρc as a function of the aspiration level A for different values of b when individuals
are situated on: ER random graphs (left panel), NW small-world networks (middle panel) and BA scale-free networks (right
panel). All networks are of 104 nodes with 50% empty nodes. Average connectivity of ER, NW and BA networks is 10, 8, 6
respectively. The equilibrium fraction of cooperators results from averaging over 2000 time steps after a transient period of
20000 time steps. Results are averaged over 100 different realizations.
the aspiration-induced migration on Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random
graphs (ER) [28], Newman-Watts small-world networks
(NW) [29] and Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks (BA)
[30]. In Fig. 5, we report the fraction of cooperators ρc
as a function of the aspiration level A for different values
of the temptation to defect b. It is interesting to find
that, for a fixed value of b, there exists an optimal A
corresponding to the maximum ρc for all three networks.
In summary, we have incorporated an aspiration-
induced migration mechanism to the evolutionary pris-
oner’s dilemma game. An individual would migrate if its
payoff is lower than the aspiration level. We find that,
for individuals locating on square lattice and the temp-
tation to defect b < 1.5, there exists an optimal range
of the aspiration level, leading to the maximum coop-
eration level. We explain such phenomenon by investi-
gating the evolution of cooperator- and defector-clusters.
Moderate aspiration level induces cooperator clusters to
expand and defector clusters to disintegrate, thus pro-
moting the diffusion of cooperation among population.
We also study the effect of the fraction of occupied sites
f on cooperation. Furthermore, studies of aspiration-
induced migration model on random graphs, small-world
networks and scale-free networks show that, there exists
an optimal value of the aspiration level that can best fa-
vor cooperative behavior for individuals situated on these
networks. Finally we have checked that our conclusions
are robust with respect to using different strategy up-
dating rules, such as Fermi updating rule [31, 32] and
the finite population analogue of the replicator dynamics
[21].
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